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PROCEDURE
EVIDENCE
Ben. R. Miller, Jr.*
EXPERT WITNESSES
The fact that a medical specialist is brought from another
state to. testify in Louisiana and is not licensed to practice medi-
cine in Louisiana would. not prevent him from qualifying as -an
expert witness if he had the specialized training, knowledge,
and competency required of such a witness. Similarly, Carvell
v..:W.inn1 held that a doctor of chiropractic was qualified to tes-
tify as an expert witness in the field of chiropractic and, physi-
ology, :even though the practice of chiropractic as such -is not
authorized in Louisiana unless the practitioner has the same
qualifications and passes the same examinations required of
"medical" doctors. Competence to testify as an expert is based
on specialized training, knowledge, and experience and is not
determined by the licensing laws of the forum. However, the
court'uof' appeal held it was within the *trial court's discretion
th-limit the area of the testimony' of the doctor of chiropractic.".
there was no abuse of discretion in excluding his testimony on
a causal connection between injuries and subsequent physical
ailments.
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION
May 'a member of a corporation called upon to show cause'
why he should not be reinoved from office and expelled- frOm
membership in the corporation refuse to answer questionsi on
the ground that his answers might tend to incriminate' him?
Due notice of the hearing was given to the member and the
hearing was in accordance with the bylaws of the corporation.
In reasoning similar to that employed in a New York case,2 th e'
court of appeal held that the witness, as an officer, stood 'ina
fiduciary relation to the corporation. As such, he could'not re-
fuse to answer questions concerning his official conduct while
*Member, Louisiana Bar; Faculty Advisor, Moot Court Program, Louisiana
State University Law School.
1. 154 So. 2d 788 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
.:'2. In re Cohen, 195 N.Y.S.2d 990 (1959), aff'd, Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S..
117 (1960), noted 20 LA. L. REV. 743. Cohen, an attorney, in a proceeding in-
vestigating unethical practices, refused to answer questions concerning certain
of his activities. He was disbarred for violation of his duty of candor and frank-
ness to the court. . . I I .;, "
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occupying that fiduciary position without subjecting himself to
the civil remedies of the corporation. 3
The majority American view- limits an "accused's" privilege
against self-incrimination to criminal proceedings, not allowing
it to be invoked in an investigation into the circumstances and
authorship of an alleged crime. 4 Louisiana's privilege is a little
broader. It may be invoked in a "proceeding that may subject
.. .... [a person] to criminal prosecution." 5 However, since the;
instant proceeding subjected the member to civil sanctions only,
the. Louisiana constitutional guaranty was inapplicable. Of
course, a private corporation could adopt articles or bylaws to
accord an "accused" a civil privilege against being compelled.to.
give testimony which would incriminate him under the rules of
the corporation or the laws of the jurisdiction.
RELEVANCY
Color Slides
Fifteen color slides were projected before the jury in State
v. Morris6 showing the torso of a homicide victim before and
during an autopsy. Blood and gore were increasingly displayed
from pictures one through fifteen until a body cavity was, shown,
with the coroner holding up various organs while a pump evac-
uated blood. The state possessed a confession from Morris that
he had shot the decedent, and the sole issue was whether the
killing was intentional or committed in the heat of passion.
Prior to the introduction of the color slides, the coroner had
testified that death resulted from gunshot wounds, which he had
identified, and the court received in evidence a black and white
picture of the wound. The only relevancy the state could assert
for introduction of the color slides was the contention that the
jury could determine from the condition of the organs, held by
the coroner, whether the decedent died from a gunshot wound or
natural causes.
The color slides were irrelevant since they did not tend to
be probative of the proposition at which they were directed, the
cause of death. A lay jury was incapable of determining wheth-
3. Heuer v. Crescent River Port Pilots' Ass'n, 158 So. 2d 221 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1963).
4. McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE § 122 (1954).
5. LA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
6. 245 La. 475, 157 So. 2d 728 (1963).
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er the organs were diseased. Even if the pictures had been pro-
bative of the cause of death, they would have been excluded on
the theory that the cause of death was not at issue. The killing
was an admitted fact. Relevant evidence - an appellation cer-
tainly not applicable to the fifteen color slides presented in State
v. Morris - is admissible if its probative value is not outweighed
by the dangers of undue prejudice, abstraction and waste of
time. After arguing relevancy, the state contended that if the
pictures were irrelevant, the defendant was not prejudiced.
However, the Supreme Court, after viewing the slides, held the
pictures were inherently prejudicial because they were "in such
form as to be highly shocking and emotionally disturbing to the
mind of the average individual."7
CHARACTER EVIDENCE
Other Crimes
Generally, evidence of other crimes of the accused is excluded
and the prosecutor is required to prove the case other than by
showing the accused is a "bad man." The relevancy of such evi-
dence is outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice to the ac-
cused. An exception is made where the evidence of other crimes
has independent relevance. For example, if the prior crimes
show the existence of a larger scheme, the evidence is admitted.
In State v. Morris" evidence was received of a prior homicide
occurring in a bar-room fight similar to the circumstances re-
sulting in the accused's present prosecution for murder. The Su-
preme Court, while reversing the conviction on other grounds,
held that the evidence 9 was properly received to show intent to
kill or inflict great bodily harm even though the prior crime oc-
curred seven years earlier.
The decision presents difficulty in two respects. First, the
court did not explore the similarity between the two crimes other
than to note they both involved homicides which occurred in
bar-rooms. Similarity of the crimes is an essential require-
ment.10 The prior crime to be admissible need not have been
7. Id. at 485, 157 So. 2d at 732.
8. 245 La. 475, 157 So. 2d 728 (1963).
9. The court said the evidence of the prior conviction was not hearsay. A
police officer present at the first conviction testified he heard the accused plead
guilty. It is submitted this was an extrajudicial declaration falling within the
definition of hearsay, but possibly admissible under an exception to the rule.
10. State v. Rives, 193 La. 186, 190 So. 374 (1939) ; WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§363 (1940).
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committed' immediately before, the act. charged. Wigmore is of
the opinion ,that a correct application of the principle would re
ceive evidence which constitutes "real probative indication of
the defendant's intent."'1 In applying this rule, the Louisiana
Supreme.Court has held evidence of cattle theft from a dairy
two months before the act charged, cattle theft from a different
dairy, did not offer probative indication of the defendant's, in-
tent in committing the second crime. 12 Even assuming similar:
ity of; crimes, a time removal of seven years would not seem to
be probative of intent in commission of the later crime. 13
Prejudicial Effects of Mention of Other Crimes
In State v. Maney 4 an exception'was sustained to the ques-
tion of a district attorney relativeto prior arrests of the accused.
The Supreme Court held that the judge's instructions to the jury
to disregard the question adequately protected the defendant's
rights. Another. illustration of the application of Article 495 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides the mandate
that no witness can be asked on cross-examination whether he
has been indicted or arrested, occurred in the past court term in
State v. Carite.15 The district attorney in closing argument said:
"Because the defendant has not been convicted before does
not, mean it's the first time he was arrested or prosecuted,
for narcotics."
A defense objection was sustained and the trial judge instruct-
ed the jury to disregard the remark. Maney was cited in sup-
port of the contention that the judge's instruction effectively
cured the admitted error. The Supreme Court said Maney was
"different," unanimously holding that if article 495 were ever
to have substance it must be applied in the instant case to cure
the prejudice through a reversal and that the instruction to the
jury was not sufficient. However, it is difficult to reconcile this
11. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 363 (1940).
12. State v. Rives, 193 La. 186, 190 So. 374 (1939).
13. Evidence of prior crimes was received without difficulty in State v.
Richard, 245 La. 465, 158 So. 2d 828 (1963). There the accused was charged with
possession of narcotics. Evidence of possession of barbiturates, a lesser crime com-
mitted at the same time as the act charged, was admitted to show the possession
of narcotics was not unintentional, inadvertent, or without guilty knowledge.
14. 242 La. 223, 135 So. 2d 473 (1961) ; commented on in The Work of the,
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1961-1962 Term- Evidence, 23 LA. L.._REV.
406, 410 (1963).
15. 244 La. 928, 155 So. 2d 21 (1963).
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decision with Maney where it was held that an instruction could
curei the prejudice flowing from a question asserting prior ar-
rests.' It is submitted that the rationale employed by the court
in Carite, should be applied to the Maney situation. If an infer-
ence of a crime is present in the state's remarks in closing argu-
ment, is it not also present in the insinuating question to the
accused:which forces the defense counsel to his feet to assert an
Objection:? The prejudice takes the same form in each case, the
accused's credibility is destroyed in the minds of the jury by
innuendo.
S..HEARSAY EVIDENCE
Admissions - Declarations Against Interest
In a direct action against an insurer of a trucking concern
for damages resulting from a sideswiping collision, a traffic of-
ficer investigating the truck-car collision was allowed to testify
that the truck driver had said after the accident that he was
changing from the right to the left lane of a four-lane highway
in order to make a left turn a few streets ahead.16 The truck
driver was present at the trial and testified. The court of appeal
held that the traffic officer was presenting hearsay testimony
admissible under the exception to the hearsay rule for the dec-
larations against interest.
It is generally regarded as a fundamental requirement for
the admission of declarations against interest that the declarant
be unavailable at the time of the trial.17 While not discussed by
the court, modern commentators have urged the deletion of the
requirement of unavailability of witnesses to receive declara-
tions against interest under this exception of the hearsay rule. 8
The same reasoning which receives admissions of parties and
spontaneous declarations without regard to availability of the
declarant, namely the theory that the testimony of extrajudicial
declarations is just as credible as the declarant's present testi-
mony would be, is applicable.
Another possible ground for admission of the extrajudicial
declaration would be the exception to the hearsay rule for ad-
16. Leblanc v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 158 So. 2d 256 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
17. Day v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 8 La. App. 720 (Orl. Cir. 1928) ; Rous-
aeau v. Texas & Pacific Ry., 4 La. App. 691 (Orl. Cir. 1926) ; McCoRMICK, EVI-
DENcE § 253 (1954).
18. UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 63(10).
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missions of parties. Admissions of agents and employees ;of par-
ties are generally excluded. The trend is to admissibility, how-
ever, and both the Model Code of Evidence 9 and the Uniform
Rules of Evidence2 0 would receive the declaration of the truck
driver as an admission of a party. These rules admit "against
a party, a statement which would be admissible if made by the
declarant at the hearing if (a) the statement concerned a matter
within the scope of an agency or employment of the declarant
for the party and was made before the termination of such
relationship ... ",21
19. ALI MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 508, comment on Rule 508(a)
(1942).
20. UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 63(9).
21. Ibid. See also Comment, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 1227 (1947).
